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Abstract 
The current studies explored the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories.  In 
Study 1, participants were exposed to a range of conspiracy theories concerning government 
involvement in significant events such as the death of Diana, Princess of Wales.  Results 
revealed that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories reduced participants’ 
intentions to engage in politics, relative to participants who were given information refuting 
conspiracy theories.  This effect was mediated by feelings of political powerlessness.  In 
Study 2, participants were exposed to conspiracy theories concerning the issue of climate 
change.  Results revealed that exposure to information supporting the conspiracy theories 
reduced participants’ intentions to reduce their carbon footprint, relative to participants who 
were given refuting information, or those in a control condition.  This effect was mediated by 
powerlessness with respect to climate change, uncertainty, and disillusionment.  Exposure to 
climate change conspiracy theories also influenced political intentions, an effect mediated by 
political powerlessness.  The current findings suggest that conspiracy theories may have 
potentially significant social consequences, and highlight the need for further research on the 
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The social consequences of conspiracism: Exposure to conspiracy theories decreases the 
intention to engage in politics and to reduce one’s carbon footprint 
Conspiracy theories can be described as attempts to explain the ultimate causes of 
events as secret plots by powerful forces rather than as overt activities or accidents 
(McCauley & Jacques, 1979).  For example, conspiracy theories relating to the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales often suppose that she was murdered by the British government as 
opposed to being killed in an unfortunate car accident.  These types of conspiracy theories are 
widespread, and accompany many significant political and social events, such as the death of 
Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Douglas & Sutton, 2011), the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010) and the assassination of US President John 
F. Kennedy (McCauley & Jacques, 1979; McHoskey, 1995).  Research has shown that 
conspiracy theories are becoming more popular, with interest in some conspiracy theories 
even increasing as the events become more distant (Goertzel, 1994).  For example, a survey 
in 1963 found that 29% of respondents believed the official account that Lee Harvey Oswald 
acted alone in assassinating President Kennedy, but in 2001 only 13% of respondents 
believed the official account (Carlson, 2001).  This finding points to the increasing popularity 
of conspiracy theories, and their persistence over time (Moore, 1990). 
Although public interest in conspiracy theories may be increasing, there has been 
surprisingly limited empirical research examining the psychological underpinnings of beliefs 
in conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Swami et al., 
2011).  Further, much of the work that does exist has categorised believers as paranoid 
individuals whose judgements are somehow “distorted” as a result of an “uncommonly angry 
mind” (Hofstadter, 1971, pp. 2-3) or as a product of psychopathology, paranoia or delusional 
ideation (e.g., Groh, 1987; Plomin & Post, 1997).  However, this account may be too 
simplistic and incomplete considering how widespread conspiracy beliefs are in society 
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(Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami & Coles, 2010; Waters, 1997).  It is difficult to imagine 
that millions of conspiracy believers all suffer significant psychological symptoms.  More 
recent research has taken a less pathologizing perspective on conspiracy beliefs, 
demonstrating that there are several key sub-clinical correlates of conspiracy beliefs such as 
anomie, distrust in authority, political cynicism, powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; 
Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010) and Machiavellianism (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
Further, research suggests that conspiracy theories may change the way people think 
about social events.  For example, after exposure to conspiracy theories about the death of 
Princess Diana, Douglas and Sutton (2008) found that participants were more inclined to 
endorse conspiratorial explanations, even though they perceived that their beliefs had not 
changed.  Also, Butler, Koopman and Zimbardo (1995) found that people who had viewed 
the film JFK – which highlights several prominent conspiracy theories surrounding the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy – were more inclined to disbelieve official 
accounts than those who had not yet viewed the film.  These findings demonstrate that 
conspiracy theories can have a “hidden impact” (Douglas & Sutton, 2008, p. 217) on people’s 
attitudes and raise an intriguing question – What social consequences might there be for 
people who are exposed to conspiracy theories?  
Scholars have begun to consider what some of these consequences might be.  It is 
argued that there may be both positive and negative consequences of being exposed to non-
mainstream explanations.  For example, conspiracy theories may allow individuals to 
question social hierarchies and as such encourage governments to be more transparent (e.g., 
Clarke, 2002; Fenster, 1999; Swami & Coles, 2010).  Conspiracy theories can also reveal 
anomalies, inconsistencies or ambiguities in official accounts of events (e.g., Clarke, 2002) 
and may open up possibilities for political debate (Miller, 2002).  Indeed, some conspiracy 
theories reveal actual anomalies in mainstream explanations, such as in the US Department of 
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Defence’s plans to orchestrate acts of terrorism and blame them on Cuba (Swami & Coles, 
2010).  On the negative side, conspiracy beliefs are associated with negative attitudes toward 
human rights and civil liberties (Swami et al., 2012), and also racist attitudes (Swami, 2012).  
One prominent conspiracy theory proposes that birth control and HIV/AIDS are a form of 
genocide against African Americans (Bird & Bogart, 2003).  Research has found that 
amongst African Americans, endorsement of this theory is associated with negative attitudes 
towards contraceptive behaviours, which can have potentially negative consequences for the 
prevention of pregnancy and sexually transmitted illnesses (Bogart & Thorburn, 2006).  In 
the current research, we further explored the potential influence of conspiracy theories on 
behavioural intentions.  To do so, we first focused on the influence of conspiracy theories on 
political engagement. 
Political behaviours consist of actions such as voting, talking to others to persuade 
them to vote for a certain candidate, donating money to candidates or political groups, and 
wearing campaign stickers (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter & Zukin, 2003).  Research has shown 
that such behaviours have decreased across the world over the last decade (Fiorina, 2002; 
Niemi & Weisberg, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansenm, 1993; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  For 
example, people are voting less than they did ten years ago, attending fewer political 
meetings, and forgoing wearing campaign stickers (Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  
There can be many reasons for these changes, such as decreasing interest in politics or the 
election process, time constraints, or even people feeling that their vote would not make a 
difference (File & Crissey, 2010, Fiorina, 2002, Putnam, 1995; 2000).  We argue that another 
key contributor to decreasing levels of political engagement may be the influence of exposure 
to conspiracy theories.   
In the age of the Internet, people are constantly bombarded with information relating 
to conspiracy theories, and there is an increasing ease with which information about such 
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theories can be distributed (Coady, 2006).  We already know that exposure to conspiracy 
theories changes people’s attitudes without their awareness (Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  It is 
therefore plausible to propose that the ever-increasing presence of conspiracy theories – 
particularly about secret and sinister government operations – may influence people’s 
intentions to engage in politics.  For example, governmental conspiracy theories may 
discourage citizens from voting because they persuade people that the government is 
involved in shady deals and plots and that outcomes are therefore beyond their control.  We 
explored this possibility with a wide range of prominent governmental conspiracy theories, 
examining the extent to which exposure to conspiracy theories influences political intentions.   
For the first time, we also examined the potential factors that may mediate such 
effects.  First, research has linked beliefs in conspiracy theories with low levels of trust 
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  In addition, research has suggested that a 
possible reason for the observed drop in political engagement could be the decline in trust 
people have for each other and different institutions (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Putnam, 1995; 2000; 
Shaffer 1981).  It is therefore possible that exposure to conspiracy theories influences 
political engagement because conspiracy theories negatively influence peoples’ levels of 
trust.  Second, feelings of powerlessness – specifically towards the government – were also 
explored as a potential mediator.  As defined in Stern’s (2000) Values-Beliefs-Norms theory 
of behaviour, powerlessness is referred to as the perception of being incapable of affecting an 
outcome by taking action.  Research has demonstrated that powerlessness is associated with 
conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  It is therefore possible that exposure to 
conspiracy theories increases feelings of powerlessness, which subsequently decreases 
intentions to engage in politics.     
Third, we tested the potential mediating role of uncertainty towards the government, 
which is viewed as a product of the immediate situation or wider social context (De Cremer 
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& Sedikides, 2005; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000).  It has been argued that a situation may 
influence the degree of uncertainty a person experiences, and the way that it is expressed, so 
that uncertainty can change with the environment (Smith, Hogg, Martin & Terry, 2007).  It is 
therefore plausible to suppose that exposure to conspiracy theories increases uncertainty, and 
indeed uncertainty may be one reason why people endorse a wide range of conspiracy 
theories, even if they are contradictory (Wood, Douglas & Sutton, in press).  This uncertainty 
may then lead to decreased intentions to become engaged in politics.  Finally, we also 
explored the potential influence of disillusionment, which is the feeling of disappointment 
that something is not what it was believed or hoped to be.  Research has shown that 
disillusionment after becoming aware of shortcomings may lead to a breakdown in 
engagement in a particular context (e.g., Niehuis & Bartell, 2006; Waller, 1938).  It is 
therefore reasonable to suppose that exposure to conspiracy theories may increase feelings of 
disillusionment at being tricked and deceived by the government.  This disillusionment may 
then lead to decreased intentions to become engaged in political processes.   
There were therefore two aims of the first study.  First, we explored the potential 
consequences of exposure to governmental conspiracy theories on intentions to engage in 
politics.  To do so, we exposed participants to an article that (a) argued in favour of a series 
of governmental conspiracy theories, or (b) argued against the same conspiracy theories.  
Participants exposed to the pro-conspiracy arguments were expected to endorse governmental 
conspiracy theories more than those who had been exposed to the anti-conspiracy arguments.  
Further, we hypothesised that exposure to information supporting conspiracy theories should 
decrease intentions to engage in politics.  Finally, the study directly tested four potential 
mediators of this predicted effect – specifically, feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, 
uncertainty and disillusionment towards the government. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and sixty eight undergraduate and postgraduate research students (108 
women and 60 men, Mage = 22.87, SD = 5.00) at a British university participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited via poster advertisements, emails and the use of the social 
networking site Facebook where they were invited to complete an online questionnaire.  They 
did so voluntarily and without monetary or course credit incentives.  The single independent 
variable was the nature of the article presented to participants (pro-conspiracy versus anti-
conspiracy), and was manipulated between-subjects.  A manipulation check measured 
participants’ judgements that a series of governmental conspiracy theories are true.  
Participants also reported feelings of mistrust, powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment 
towards the government, which were measured as potential mediators for the predicted effect.  
Finally, a scale of intended political behaviour formed the dependent variable.   
Materials and procedure 
  The online questionnaire was designed using the Qualtrics questionnaire design tool 
and first presented participants with an information page where they were asked to give their 
consent before beginning the questionnaire.  On the following page, participants were 
presented with the manipulation.  Two articles were used to either expose participants to 
information that supports conspiracy theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or that refutes 
conspiracy theories (anti-conspiracy condition).  The pro-conspiracy article began by arguing 
that governments are involved in secret plots and schemes.  It then continued to provide 
specific examples of conspiracy theories such as the death of Princess Diana and the London 
7/7 terrorist bombing attacks.  An extract from the conspiracy article is as follows: 
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“…To take the example of Princess Diana’s death, it is no secret that the British 
government were discontented with Princess Diana’s involvement with Dodi Fayed 
and also with her increasing involvement in politics… one must therefore question the 
claim that her death was simply a tragic accident…” 
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but differed by 
using the same broad and specific examples to argue that governments are not involved in 
conspiracy theories.  An extract from the anti-conspiracy theory article is as follows: 
“…To take the example of Princess Diana’s death, it is no secret that Princess 
Diana’s popularity made some members of the government uneasy.  However, there is 
no evidence at all to suggest that the British government were involved in her death... 
her death was simply a tragic accident... ” 
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the articles.  To check that the 
manipulation was successful, participants next rated the likelihood that a series of 
governmental conspiracy theories are true.  These were adapted from previous research 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 2011, α = .90).  There were 12 statements with a mix of general 
(e.g., “Governments are often involved in international plots and schemes”, α = .80) and 
specific (e.g., “The British government was involved in the death of Princess Diana”, α = .90) 
government conspiracy theories.  In each case, participants were asked to rate the likelihood 
that each is true on a seven-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely).  
A scale measuring mistrust towards four institutions (α = .85) was used from Van der 
Meer (2010). Participants indicated the extent to which they trusted each institution (e.g., “I 
have trust in Parliament”) on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  A 
three-item scale measuring powerlessness towards the government (α = .82) was developed 
from Neal and Groat (1974) and Aarts and Thomasse (2008).  Participants were asked to read 
the statements (e.g., “The world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the 
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little person can do about it”) and rate their agreement by answering on a six-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  A scale measuring a person’s feelings of uncertainty, 
specifically concerning the government (α = .83) was adapted from the Attributional 
Confidence Scale (Clatterbuck, 1979) and consisted of four items (e.g., “The government is 
only run for the benefit of those in power”).  Participants rated the extent that they agreed 
they could predict each behaviour on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly 
agree).  High agreement demonstrates a greater prediction that the government would 
perform those behaviours, which therefore demonstrates a greater sense of uncertainty about 
the government as a whole.  A scale was included to measure participants’ feelings of 
disillusionment, specifically about the government (α = .76).  This scale was adapted from 
Niehuis and Bartell (2006) and consisted of four statements (e.g., “I am very disappointed 
with the government”) where participants responded with the extent to which they agreed 
with each statement on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). 
Finally, the dependent variable measured participants’ intended political engagement.  
Questions were reworded so that participants’ responses reflected intended rather than 
previous political engagement (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter & Zukin, 2003; Pattie, Seyd & 
Whiteley, 2003).  There were seven statements in total asking participants about their 
intended behaviours over the next 12 months (e.g., “Will you vote in the next election”; “Do 
you intend to contribute money to a candidate, a political party, or any organization that 
supports candidates?”, α= .80).  Participants responded by indicating the extent that they 
intended to engage in each of the behaviours on a seven-point scale (1 = definitely no, 7 = 
definitely yes).  1  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed in writing 
and were thanked for their participation.  
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Results 
 There were no significant effects involving participant gender, so this factor is not 
mentioned further.  Further, participant age was not associated with any of the potential 
mediating variables or DVs and it is also not mentioned further.   
Manipulation check  
  There was a significant difference between the two article conditions (pro-conspiracy 
versus anti-conspiracy) for endorsement of both general, F(1,166) = 16.70, p < .001, η2 = .09, 
and specific, F(1,166) = 16.65, p < .001, η2 = .09 government conspiracy theories.  
Participants who were exposed to information supporting conspiracy theories endorsed 
general (M = 4.81, SD = 1.16) and specific (M = 2.85, SD = 1.50) conspiracy theories more 
than those in the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.16; M = 2.07, SD = 1.10, 
respectively).  The manipulation was therefore successful.   
Government conspiracy theories and political engagement 
  A one-way ANOVA was conducted with article condition (pro- versus anti-
conspiracy) as the independent variable, and political engagement as the dependent variable.  
As predicted, exposure to conspiracy theories influenced political intentions, F(1,166) = 9.51, 
p = .002, η2 = .05.  Specifically, participants in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.67, SD = 
1.09) showed less intention to engage in political behaviours than those in the anti-conspiracy 
condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.22).  
Testing mediation 
To test potential mediators of this effect, four separate ANOVAs were first conducted 
with article condition (pro- versus anti-conspiracy) as the independent variable in each case, 
and summed scores on all four potential mediators – mistrust, political powerlessness, 
uncertainty and disillusionment – as dependent variables.  Results revealed that out of the 
four potential mediators, exposure to conspiracy theories only influenced powerlessness, 
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F(1,166) = 13.07, p < .001, η2 = .07, and uncertainty, F(1,166) = 10.37, p = .002, η2 = .06.  
Participants in the pro-conspiracy condition felt more powerless (M = 2.94, SD = 1.39) and 
uncertain (M = 4.31, SD = 1.04) towards the government than those in the anti-conspiracy 
condition (M = 2.29, SD = 1.09; M = 3.82, SD = 0.99, respectively).  There were no 
differences between the two conditions for mistrust, F(1,166) = 1.670, p = .198, n2 = .01 or, 
disillusionment, F(1,166) = 2.48, p = .117, η2 = .01. 
Each of the candidate mediators – political powerlessness and uncertainty – was then 
examined in a test of multiple mediation in order to explain the effect of the pro- versus anti-
conspiracy information on intended political behaviours.  This multiple mediation was carried 
out using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping method for indirect effects.  This method 
is based on between 5000-10000 bootstrap re-samples used to describe the confidence 
intervals of indirect effects in a manner that makes no assumptions about the distribution of 
the indirect effects.  As argued by Hayes (2009; Hayes & Preacher, 2012), an indirect effect 
is estimated as being significant from the confidence intervals not containing a zero, as 
opposed to significance in the individual paths.  This is due to the mediation model not being 
pertinent to whether the individual paths are either significant or non-significant.  Results 
from the current study are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here) 
First, there was a significant total indirect effect.  Importantly, the specific indirect 
effect in this test indicated that political powerlessness was a significant mediator of the 
effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political behaviours, when 
controlling for uncertainty.  However the specific indirect effect of uncertainty was not found 
to be a significant mediator, when controlling for political powerlessness.  This provides 
evidence that political powerlessness was the driving mediator of the effect of exposure to 
conspiracy theories on intended political behaviours.  
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Discussion 
In Study 1, we found that exposure to conspiracy theories influenced participants’ 
intentions to engage in political processes such as voting.  Demonstrating that exposure to 
conspiracy theories influences intended political engagement gives a hint to the extent to 
which conspiracy theories may be influential.  Voting and other forms of political 
engagement are decreasing around the world (e.g., Fiorina, 2002), and revealing that intended 
political behaviours can be influenced by exposure to conspiracy theories suggests that 
decreased engagement could be due, in part, to how widespread conspiracy theories are in 
society (Swami & Coles, 2010).  This study has also extended previous research investigating 
the impact of conspiracy theories (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 2008).  Here, it has 
been demonstrated that while exposure to conspiracy theories can influence the extent to 
which the theory is endorsed, it can also influence a person’s behavioural intentions.  
Further, Study 1 demonstrated that feelings of powerlessness towards the government 
fully mediated the effect of pro- versus anti-conspiracy information on intended political 
behaviours.  This suggests that being exposed to government conspiracy theories may 
increase feelings that one’s actions will have little impact, which may subsequently lower 
one’s intentions to engage in political behaviours.  This line of reasoning is consistent with 
results from a recent American census (File & Crissey, 2010) – when asked why people did 
not vote, many responded with the reason that their vote would not make a difference.   
This study also extends previous research that has revealed an association between 
powerlessness and endorsement of conspiracy theories.  In the current study however, we 
demonstrated that exposure to conspiracy theories directly influenced participants’ feeling of 
powerlessness towards the government.  Previous research has only been able to demonstrate 
correlations between endorsement of conspiracy theories and powerlessness without 
indicating the direction of the relationship (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  Whilst some 
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individuals may endorse conspiracies to reduce their feelings of powerlessness (Swami & 
Coles, 2010), it can be suggested from the current findings that exposure to conspiracy 
theories may also bring about feelings of powerlessness.  
Although uncertainty was shown not to be a significant mediator of the relationship 
between exposure to conspiracy theories and political behaviour, participants who were 
exposed to conspiracy theories felt more uncertain towards the government than those 
exposed to an anti-conspiracy account.  This also extends previous literature by providing 
evidence of a directional relationship between conspiracy beliefs and uncertainty.  There 
were however no reported effects of exposure to conspiracy theories on mistrust and 
disillusionment.  This was an unexpected finding as previous research suggests that mistrust 
is associated with conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  However, it may be 
difficult to manipulate mistrust and disillusionment by exposure to a wide variety of 
governmental conspiracy theories.  Using this method, it is difficult to manipulate trust in one 
particular group because different groups are implicated in different conspiracy theories (e.g., 
US government, British government, specific politicians).  Trust and disillusionment could 
perhaps be better influenced by exposure to specific conspiracy theories such as those related 
to climate change, that are associated with a single group of apparently dishonest individuals 
(i.e., climate scientists) rather than a wider group.  We test this possibility in Study 2, which 
also serves to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1.   
Study 2 
 In Study 2, we focused on the influence of climate change conspiracy theories on 
intentions to reduce one’s carbon footprint.  Specifically, we investigated whether conspiracy 
theories concerning the validity of scientific claims concerning climate change influence 
people’s intentions to purchase energy efficient light bulbs or use other means of transport 
than driving a motor vehicle.  Research has demonstrated that engagement with such 
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behaviours – in a similar way to political engagement – is not sufficiently high in Western 
societies (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2003).  For example, a recent Gallup Poll found that American 
respondents ranked the environment 15th (out of 15) of the most important problems today 
(Gallup, 2011), and another poll found that American respondents ranked climate change as 
the 12th most important (out of 13) environmental issues facing people today (Dunlap & 
Saad, 2001).  This is intriguing, especially given that climate change is arguably the primary 
environmental risk confronting the world in the 21st century (Leiserowitz, 2003).  Recent 
research has found an association between conspiracy beliefs in general and rejection of 
climate science claims (Lewandowsky, Oberauer & Gignac, in press).  We argue here that 
exposure to information that rejects climate science claims will adversely influence people’s 
intentions to engage in climate friendly behaviours.    
To test this prediction, we utilised a similar method to Study 1, exposing participants 
to climate change conspiracy theories (versus anti-conspiracy material), and measuring the 
extent to which participants intended to engage with efforts to reduce their carbon footprint.  
We also examined the influence of exposure to conspiracy theories on political intentions, 
using the same scale as used in Study 1.  In doing so, it was possible to examine whether a 
type of conspiracy theory that does not explicitly accuse the government of any actions can 
also lead to political disengagement.  This is an intriguing possibility because it points to the 
potential for conspiracy theorizing to form part of a political mindset – a set of beliefs that are 
associated with political suspicion and disbelief of official explanations.  We also included 
the range of mediators tested in Study 1.  Indeed, previous research has linked climate change 
behaviour to feelings of powerlessness (Aitken, Chapman & McClure, 2011), uncertainty 
(e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, 2007; Hine & Gifford, 1996), and mistrust (MacGregor, Slovic, 
Mason & Detweiler, 1994) and we examined here if climate change conspiracy theories 
influence intentions via these potential mediators.   
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Further, Study 2 provided a methodological refinement to Study 1 by including a 
control condition where participants were exposed to no information regarding conspiracy 
theories.  Study 1 demonstrated a difference in political intentions between the pro- and anti-
conspiracy conditions but it cannot be known for certain whether the pro-conspiracy 
condition decreased political intentions or whether the anti-conspiracy condition increased 
such intentions.  A control condition allows us to be certain of the direction of the effect. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Two hundred and fourteen undergraduate students (182 women and 32 men, Mage = 
19.66, SD = 3.06) at a British university participated in an online experimental questionnaire.  
Participants received course credit in exchange for their participation.  A timer was used to 
identify participants who had spent less than 30 seconds reading the manipulation and who 
had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper college students (Speed Reading, 
2011).  Such participants were excluded from the analyses, and in total this was 11 
participants from the pro-conspiracy condition and 12 from the anti-conspiracy condition.  
The final sample size used for data analysis was therefore 191 (164 women and 27 men, Mage 
= 19.75, SD = 3.21).  There were 63 participants in the pro-conspiracy condition, 59 in the 
anti-conspiracy condition, and 69 in the control condition. 
A single-factor independent variable (pro-conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. control) 
between-subject design was employed.  A manipulation check measured participants’ 
judgements that a series of climate change conspiracy theories are true.  Participants reported 
feelings of climate powerlessness, uncertainty, disillusionment and trust towards different 
sources to tell the truth about climate change, which were measured as potential mediators for 
the predicted effect on climate change intentions.  Participants also reported feelings of 
political powerlessness, which were measured as a possible mediator for the predicted effect 
Social consequences of conspiracy theories        17 
of exposure to climate change conspiracy theories on political intentions.  Finally, scales of 
intended climate change behaviours and intended political behaviours formed the two 
dependent variables.   
Materials and procedure 
  As in Study 1, the online questionnaire was designed using the Qualtrics 
questionnaire design tool and first presented participants with an information page where they 
were asked to give their consent before beginning the questionnaire.  On the following page, 
two articles were used to either expose participants to information that supports conspiracy 
theories (pro-conspiracy condition) or information that refutes conspiracy theories (anti-
conspiracy condition).  A control condition was also included, where no further information 
was given.  The pro-conspiracy article began by arguing that climate change is a hoax.  It 
then continued to provide specific examples of conspiracy theories such as that climate 
change scientists are just chasing funding and not all scientists agree with the climate change 
findings.  An extract from the conspiracy article was as follows: 
“…further, the idea of global warming holds little weight.  Independent evidence 
shows that since 1940, global average temperatures fell for four decades.  This 
presents a significant flaw in the official account…” 
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but 
differed by arguing that climate change is not a hoax.  An extract from the anti-conspiracy 
theory article was as follows: 
“…further, evidence of global warming is robust.  Independent evidence shows that 
the last two decades of the 20th century were the hottest in 400 years …. Numerous 
findings such as this present significant support for the official account…” 
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the articles.  To check 
that the manipulation was successful, participants next rated the likelihood that a series of 
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climate change conspiracy theories are true.  Those in the control condition also completed 
this manipulation check.  These statements were adapted from previous research (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2011).  There were seven statements in total (e.g., “Climate change is a hoax”; “The 
idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud”, α = .93).   
A scale was used to assess a person’s feelings of powerlessness, specifically 
concerning climate change (Aitken et al., 2011).  This scale consisted of three items (e.g., “I 
feel that my actions will not affect the outcome of climate change”, α = .71) where 
participants indicted the extent to which they agreed to each statement on a six-point scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  A further scale measuring uncertainty about 
climate change was used from Aitken et al., (2011).  The scale consisted of two items (e.g., “I 
feel uncertain as to whether climate change is a significant problem”, α = .60) where 
participants indicted the extent to which they agreed to each statement on a six-point scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). 
A scale was also included to measure participants’ feelings of disillusionment, 
specifically towards climate change scientists.  This scale was adapted from Niehuis and 
Bartell (2006) and consisted of four statements (e.g., “I am very disappointed with the 
climate change scientists”, α = .77) where participants responded with the extent to which 
they agreed with each statement on a six-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly 
agree).  Further, a scale measuring trust towards a variety of sources to tell the truth about 
climate change was developed from Leiserowitz (2003).  This scale consisted of seven trust 
sources (e.g., “Climate change scientists”, α = .65) where participants indicated the extent 
they trusted the source to tell the truth about climate change on a six-point scale (1 = strongly 
distrust, 6 = strongly trust).  Further, the three-item scale measuring powerlessness, 
specifically concerning politics, was used as in Study 1 (α = .68).  
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The first dependent variable measured participants’ intended climate change 
behaviours.  Questions were adapted from previous research so that participant’s responses 
reflected their intended behaviour (Leiserowitz, 2003).  There were seven statements in total 
asking participants about their intended behaviours over the next 12 months (e.g., “Do you 
intend to use energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying a light bulb or household 
appliance”; “Do you intend to walk or cycle more than driving or using public transport?”, α 
= .80).  Participants responded by indicating the extent that they intended to engage in each 
of the behaviours on a seven-point scale (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes).  The second 
dependent variable measured participants’ intended political behaviours using the same 
questions as in Study 1 (α = .77).  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were 
debriefed in writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results 
There were no significant effects involving participant gender, so this factor is not 
mentioned further.  Further, participant age was not associated with any of the potential 
mediating variables or DVs and it is also not mentioned further.   
Manipulation check  
There was a significant difference in endorsement of climate change conspiracy 
theories between conditions, F(2, 188) = 11.35, p <. 001, η2 = .11.  Endorsement of climate 
change conspiracies was significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.69) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.31, SD = 1.01, p < .001) and the control 
condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.13, p = .001).  Endorsement of climate change conspiracy 
theories was not significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control 
condition (p = .18).  The manipulation was therefore successful.  
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Climate conspiracy theories and intended climate behaviours 
Results revealed a significant difference in climate change intentions between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 3.673, p = .027, η2 = .04.  Specifically, climate change intentions 
were significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.14) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.02, p = .019) and the control condition (M = 3.81, SD 
= 1.13 p = .021).  Intentions to engage in climate-friendly behaviours were not significantly 
different in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control (p = .91).  
Climate conspiracy theories and intended political behaviours 
Results also revealed a significant difference in political intentions between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 5.934, p = .003, η2 = .06.  Specifically, political intentions were 
significantly lower in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.62, SD = 0.78) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 3.17, SD = 0.91, p = .003) and the control condition (M = 3.14, SD 
= 1.22, p = .003).  Political intentions were not significantly different in the anti-conspiracy 
condition relative to the control (p = .88).  
Testing mediation 
Exposure to climate change conspiracy theories therefore influenced intentions to 
engage in both climate change and political behaviours.  To test potential mediators of these 
two effects, separate ANOVAs were firstly conducted with conspiracy condition (pro-
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy versus control) as the independent variable, and summed 
scores on all potential mediators for climate change behaviours (climate powerlessness, 
uncertainty, disillusionment and trust), and summed scores on the one potential mediator for 
political behaviours (political powerlessness) as dependent variables.   
Results revealed a marginally significant difference in climate powerlessness between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 2.711, p = .069, η2 = .03.  Specifically, climate powerlessness was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.20) than the anti-
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conspiracy condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.08, p = .025) and marginally significantly higher than 
the control (M = 3.06, SD = 1.16, p = .10).  Powerlessness towards climate change was not 
significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative to the control condition (p = .49).  
Results also revealed a marginally significant difference in uncertainty between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 2.610, p = .076, η2 = .03.  Specifically, uncertainty was significantly 
higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.42, SD = 1.09) than the anti-conspiracy 
condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.05, p = .031) and marginally significantly higher than the control 
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.06, p = .089).  Uncertainty was not significantly higher in the anti-
condition relative to the control condition (p = .59).  
Further, results revealed a significant difference in disillusionment between 
conditions, F(2, 188) = 4.411, p = .013, η2 = .05.  Specifically, disillusionment was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 2.72, SD = 1.00) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 2.28, SD = 0.87, p = .008) and the control (M = 2.33, SD = 0.92, p 
= .015).  Disillusionment was not significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy condition relative 
to the control condition (p = .75).  There were no reported differences in trust across all 
combined sources between conditions, F(2, 188) = 0.81, p = .448, η2 = .00.   
Finally in relation to the mediator for the effect of conspiracy condition on intended 
political behaviours, results revealed a significant difference in political powerlessness 
between conditions, F(2, 188) = 27.60, p <. 001, η2 = .23.  Specifically, powerlessness was 
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.59, SD = 0.69) than the anti-
conspiracy condition (M = 2.78, SD = 0.75, p = .003) and the control (M = 2.70, SD = 0.81, p 
< .001).  Powerlessness was not significantly higher in the anti-conspiracy condition relative 
to the control condition (p = .56). 
Each of the candidate mediators was then examined in a test of mediation in order to 
explain the effect of the conspiracy conditions (pro-conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy, versus 
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control) on climate and political intentions separately.  The mediators of climate 
powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment were examined in a test of multiple mediation 
in explaining climate change behavioural intentions.  The mediator of political powerlessness 
was examined in a test of simple mediation in explaining political intentions.  These multiple 
and simple mediations were carried out using Hayes and Preacher’s (2012) bootstrapping 
method for indirect effects.  This differed slightly from the method used in Study 1 as it 
allowed the mediations between the three conspiracy conditions to be tested by the use of 
indicator coding (see Table 2).  The pro-conspiracy condition was coded as the representative 
condition, whereby controlling for pro-conspiracy condition to control (D2) enabled the 
effect for pro-conspiracy condition to anti-conspiracy condition (D1) to be explored, and vice 
versa.  This indictor coding was automatically completed using the Hayes and Preacher’s 
(2012) SPSS macro.  Results from the current study are presented in Tables 3 and 4 and 
Figures 2 and 3, for climate change and political behaviours intentions, respectively. 
(Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 here) 
(Insert Figures 2 and 3 here) 
 Climate change behaviours.  A multiple mediation analysis of the effect of pro-
conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy condition on intended climate change behaviours (D1) 
(when controlling for pro-conspiracy versus control, D2) indicated that climate 
powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment (controlling for all three other mediators) 
significantly mediated this effect.  Second, the effect for D2 (controlling for D1) concurred, 
which demonstrated that climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment were 
significant mediators of the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on climate change 
behaviour (pro- versus anti-conspiracy conditions and pro-conspiracy versus control).  
Intended political behaviours.  A simple mediation of the effect of pro-conspiracy 
versus anti-conspiracy condition on intended political behaviours – testing the specific 
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indirect effect for both D1 (controlling for D2) and D2 (controlling for D1) – indicated that 
political powerlessness significantly mediated this effect.  
Discussion 
 In Study 2, participants were exposed to either a pro-conspiracy or anti-conspiracy 
account of events (plus a control condition).  We measured participant’s intentions to reduce 
their carbon footprint and to engage in politics, and found that exposure to climate change 
conspiracy theories reduced participants’ intentions to engage in both types of behaviours.  
The effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on intended climate change behaviours was 
mediated by climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment.  Supporting the 
possibility that conspiracy theories in general may be associated with political cynicism, the 
effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on intended political behaviours was mediated by 
feelings of political powerlessness.  That is, climate change conspiracy theories, that do not 
explicitly accuse the government, can lead to political disengagement through feelings of 
political powerlessness.  
General discussion 
Psychologists are learning more about the individual traits associated with beliefs in 
conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-Papp et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 
1994; Swami, et al., 2010) and the extent to which conspiracy theories influence people’s 
attitudes about significant social and political events (Butler et al., 1995; Douglas & Sutton, 
2008).  However, there is a need to understand what these beliefs entail.  The current research 
sought to examine some of the potential consequences associated with exposure to conspiracy 
theories.  Study 1 demonstrated that exposure to governmental conspiracy theories led to 
heightened feelings of political powerlessness, which reduced intentions to engage in politics.  
In Study 2, we showed that exposure to climate change conspiracy theories increased feelings 
of climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment, which in turn lowered intentions 
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to reduce ones carbon footprint.  Study 2 also demonstrated that exposure to climate change 
conspiracy theories, like governmental conspiracy theories in Study 1, led to feelings of 
political powerlessness, which reduced intentions to engage in politics.  Overall, these studies 
demonstrate that exposure to conspiracy theories may have potentially detrimental effects.  
We know from previous research that engagement with politics and climate change is 
undesirably low in Western societies (e.g., Fiorina, 2002; Leiserowitz, 2003; Niemi & 
Weisberg, 2001; Rosenstone & Hansenm, 1993; Putnam, 1995; 2000).  Conspiracy theories 
may be an important source of ongoing disengagement, and may even serve to increase 
disengagement.   
The results of Study 2 suggest a further intriguing possibility.  Specifically, we 
demonstrated that climate change conspiracy theories not only influenced intentions to 
engage in efforts to reduce one’s carbon footprint, but also reduced intentions to engage in 
politics.  That is, climate change conspiracy theories influenced intentions to engage in 
behaviour in a domain unrelated to the specific conspiracy theories themselves.  Perhaps 
therefore, exposure to conspiracy theories in general is associated with a ‘conspiratorial 
mindset’ related to political beliefs and intentions.  Potentially, other types of conspiracy 
theories may be related to feelings of political cynicism and powerlessness.  Future research 
may endeavour to test this possibility, examining for example whether other types of 
conspiracy theories such as those related to child immunisation, AIDS and specific 
conspiracy theories about social groups (e.g., anti-Jewish conspiracy theories) influence 
political beliefs and political engagement rather than simply beliefs and behaviours 
associated with the specific conspiracy theories themselves.  As Wood et al. (2012) have 
recently demonstrated, people are inclined to believe even contradictory conspiracy theories 
as long as they are supported by the notion of an overarching ‘cover-up’.  Likewise, political 
cynicism may form a fundamental basis of conspiracy theorizing.   
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The current findings revealed mixed results with respect to mediation.  Specifically, 
climate powerlessness, uncertainty and disillusionment explained the effect of exposure to 
conspiracy theories on climate change intentions.  However, only political powerlessness 
mediated the relationship between exposure to governmental conspiracy theories and the 
intention to engage with politics.  These are intriguing findings, and point to the possibility 
that variables such as uncertainty and disillusionment may indeed be manipulated by raising 
suspicion about the actions of a specific group.  On the other hand, mediators such as 
powerlessness may be associated with more general conspiracism, and political cynicism.  
Future research may endeavour to examine if different mediational patterns hold for different 
types of conspiracy theories.  It is also important to discuss potential reasons why, in the 
current research, conspiracy theories were not associated with mistrust.  Indeed, this is 
inconsistent with previous research (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999).  It is possible that 
although conspiracy theories may lead to powerlessness, the same directional effect does not 
apply to mistrust.  Perhaps instead, mistrust draws people towards conspiracy theories rather 
than being a consequence of being exposed to conspiracy theories.  Unfortunately the current 
studies cannot address this possibility but future research may attempt to determine the causal 
direction of any relationship between mistrust and beliefs in conspiracy theories.   
The research had some important limitations that should also be addressed in future 
research.  First, it should be noted that although the effects observed in the current studies 
were statistically robust, the effect sizes were small (η2 = .05 in Study 1; η2 = .04 and η2 = .06 
in Study 2).  This means that the proportion of variance in political intentions and climate 
change intentions explained by exposure to conspiracy theories was quite modest and that 
there are potentially many other factors that contribute to such intentions.  Further, it is 
important to note that our findings were based on self-report measures of intentions to engage 
in political and climate change behaviours.  As we know, intentions do not always translate 
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into actual behaviours (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Linn, 1965; Sheeran, 2002).  Therefore, future 
work should examine how exposure to conspiracy theories influences actual political and 
climate change behaviours.  Future research should also rely less on student samples that may 
not be representative of the population, and also address the participant gender imbalance in 
the current studies. 
Future research may also examine some of the potential positive consequences of 
conspiracy theories.  For example, conspiracy theories may allow people to challenge 
existing social hierarchies and encourage government transparency (e.g., Clarke, 2002; 
Swami & Coles, 2010).  More generally, previous research has tended to pathologize 
conspiracy beliefs, linking them with negative individual characteristics such as mistrust and 
anomie (e.g., Goertzel, 1994).  While not disputing these findings, there are reasons to 
believe that positively valued individual differences may increase people’s willingness to 
believe conspiracy theories.  For example, conspiracy theories posit novel, often elaborate 
and unconventional explanations for events.  Therefore, they may appeal to dispositionally 
creative (e.g., Carson, Peterson & Higgins, 2005), curious (e.g., Flegg & Hukins, 2007), 
sensitive (e.g., Guarino, Roger & Olason, 2007) or open-minded (e.g., Haiman, 1964) people.  
By examining such variables, we hope to achieve a more balanced and nuanced 
conceptualisation of conspiracy beliefs and begin to consider what some of their positive 
consequences might be.   
Conclusion 
Research exploring the consequences of conspiracy theories is timely because despite 
claims that they are harmful, especially in raising suspicion concerning scientific claims (e.g., 
Goertzel, 2010; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008), there is little evidence supporting this claim.  
The current studies demonstrate that some wariness about conspiracy theories may indeed be 
warranted.  Specifically, the current research provides evidence that exposure to conspiracy 
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theories may potentially have important social consequences.  People who were exposed to 
conspiracy theories about both shady and suspicious government operations and that climate 
change is a hoax reported less intention to engage in the political system – an effect that 
occurred because conspiracy theories led to feelings of political powerlessness.  Further, 
people who were exposed to conspiracy theories about climate change reported less intention 
to reduce their carbon footprint – an effect that occurred because conspiracy theories led to 
feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty towards climate change, and also feelings of 
disappointment in climate scientists. The current research therefore opens up a new line of 
research investigating the social consequences of an ever-growing climate of conspiracism.   
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Table 1. 
Simple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Information Type (conspiracy versus mainstream) 
on Political Behaviours through Feelings of Political Powerlessness and Uncertainty (N= 
168; 5,000 bootstrap samples)  
 
  BCaa 95% conference 
interval (CI) 
 Point Estimate  
(s.e.) 
Lower Higher 
Multiple indirect effects    
     Political Powerlessness   
     Uncertainty 






     Total mediated effect .18 (.06) 0.0480 0.3531 
 
Note. Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the BCaa 95% confidence interval 
(CI) which does not contain a zero. 
a Refers to bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI) that include 
corrections for both median bias and skew (see Efron, 1987). 
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Figure 1.  
Multiple mediation test of the relationship between information type (conspiracy versus 
mainstream) and intended political behaviors 

















Adj R2 = .14, F(3,164) = 9.70, p < .001 
 







B = .54**, S.E. = .18 
Intended Political 
Behaviours 
  b2 
B = .05, S.E. = .09 
b1 
B = -.32***, S.E. = .08 
  a1 
B = -.65***, S.E. = .19 
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Table 2.  
A Table of Indicator Coding (Referred to as ‘D’) used in the Multiple and Simple Hayes’ and 
Preacher (2012) Bootstrapping Indirect Mediations for the Conspiracy Conditions (Pro-















                                     Conspiracy Condition 
Indicator Coding Pro-conspiracy Anti-conspiracy Control 
D1 0 1 0 
D2 0 0 1 
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Table 3. 
Multiple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding; see Table 2) on Intended Climate 
Change Behaviors (DV) through Feelings of Climate Powerlessness (a), Uncertainty (b) and Disillusionment (c) (MVs) (N = 191; 
10,000 bootstrap samples)  
Note.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 90% confidence interval (CI) which does not contain a 
zero.  
*p < .10.  **p < .05.   ***p < .01. 
                      Normal test theory    
 




































Monte Carlo 90% 
Conference Intervals 
  Lower       Upper 
D1 a1a -.47 (.21)**  c1 .47 (.20)** c1’ .19 (.18) .19 (.09) 0.0438 0.3432 
 a1b -.42 (.20)**      .06 (.08) 0.0409 0.3051 
 a1c   -.45 (.17)***      .04 (.07) 0.0641 0.3068 
D2 a2a -.33 (.20)*  c2 .50 (.19)** c2’ .24 (.17) .13 (.08) 0.0012 0.2706 
 a2b -.32 (.19)*      .04 (.08) 0.0069 0.2605 
 a2c -.40 (.16)**      .03 (.07) 0.0478 0.2780 
 ‘MV’     ba  -.39 (.07)*** 
   
      
bb 
bc 
 -.14 (.08)* 
 -.08 (.09)    
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Figure 2.  
Multiple mediation test of the relationship between conspiracy condition (using indicate 
coding; see Table 2) and intended climate change behaviors 
Note. Dashed straight lines highlight non-significant path relationships and solid straight 
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Table 4. 
Simple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Conspiracy Condition (using Indicator Coding; see Table 2) on Political Behaviours (DV) through 




Note.  Boldface type highlights a significant effect as determined by the Monte Carlo 95% confidence interval (CI) which does not contain a zero. 
**p < .05.  ***p < .01. 
  
                    Normal test theory     
 











    Coeff. 





















Point Estimate  
(s.e.) 
Monte Carlo 95% 
Conference Intervals 
 
 Lower          Upper 
D1 a1 -.81 (.14)***  c1 .54 (.18)** c1’ .24 (.19) .30 (.09) 0.1382 0.4916 
D2 a2 -.89 (.13)***  c2 .52 (.17)** c2’ .19 (.19) .32 (.10) 0.1561 0.5369 
 ‘MV’     b -.37 (.09)*** 
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Figure 3.  
Simple mediation test of the relationship between conspiracy condition (using indicate coding; 
see Table 2) and intended political behaviors 
Note. Dashed straight lines highlight non-significant path relationships and solid straight lines 
highlight significant path relationships. 
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